Detect server-side request forgery (SSRF) before merge.

See how server-side request forgery (SSRF) fits local review, which evidence Code Radar produces, where coverage ends, and how trusted findings move into CI.

radar scan . --quick

What server-side request forgery (SSRF) means here.

The server-side request forgery (SSRF) rule identifies review patterns that can create exploitable behavior or hide material maintenance risk, then returns the affected location, severity, confidence, and remediation context.

Evidence to inspect

Verify the input scope, finding detail, workflow handoff, and product boundary before you install or buy.

CriterionEvidence to inspectBoundary
Input scopeSelected files, configuration, scan mode, and enabled rules.Only included paths and configured checks are evaluated.
Finding detailFile, line, rule ID, severity, explanation, and repair direction.Illustrative output is not a result from your repository.
Workflow handoffLocal result, report format, agent context, and optional CI signal.Enable exports or CI only when the workflow needs them.
Decision fitUse the same criteria on a real repository before choosing a plan or tool.No universal winner or guaranteed outcome is claimed.

Check this risk locally

Verify the input scope, finding detail, workflow handoff, and product boundary before you install or buy.

The problem this page helps clarify

The useful question is where server-side request forgery (SSRF) changes the review loop: what enters the scan, who acts on a finding, and which evidence moves forward. Detect untrusted URLs reaching outbound requests without an allowlist.

  • Audience: Developers and reviewers deciding how to handle server-side request forgery (SSRF) findings before merge.
  • Focus: Detect untrusted URLs reaching outbound requests without an allowlist.
  • Review question: What does server-side request forgery (SSRF) cover in practice?

Coverage and concrete signals

For server-side request forgery (SSRF), inspect the concrete scope below instead of relying on a category label. Identify the user-controlled URL, the outbound client, and the allowlist or service selector used by the safer example.

  • Focus: Detect untrusted URLs reaching outbound requests without an allowlist.
  • Workflow: Rule ID: RADAR-SEC-SSRF
  • Coverage and concrete signals: RADAR-SEC-SSRF, unsafe pattern, safer pattern, Source security
FocusExact file location, rule context, severity, confidence, and remediation guidance.Boundary
Detect untrusted URLs reaching outbound requests without an allowlist.Identify the user-controlled URL, the outbound client, and the allowlist or service selector used by the safer example.Internal service URLs or fixed destinations may be safe when the allowlist is enforced; test redirects, DNS rebinding, and unexpected schemes before closing the finding.

Risky pattern / Safer pattern

server-side request forgery (SSRF): A useful result must be explainable to a developer and portable to the next review surface. Inspect the concrete evidence below before changing team policy.

Risky patternSafer pattern
fetch(request.query.url);fetch(allowlistedServiceUrl(request.query.service));

From local signal to shared gate.

server-side request forgery (SSRF): Use the smallest workflow that proves value. Each later step should reuse evidence the team already understands. Detect untrusted URLs reaching outbound requests without an allowlist.

StepCommand or actionDecision
1Run a quick local scanIs the signal useful?
2Inspect and repair findingsIs the fix specific and reproducible?
3Export portable evidenceDoes the reviewer need SARIF, JSON, or HTML?
4Promote the trusted threshold to CIWhich severity should block a pull request?
radar scan . --quick
radar scan . --format sarif --fail-on high

Evidence to inspect before you trust the result.

server-side request forgery (SSRF): A useful result must be explainable to a developer and portable to the next review surface. Inspect the concrete evidence below before changing team policy. Identify the user-controlled URL, the outbound client, and the allowlist or service selector used by the safer example.

  • Rule ID: RADAR-SEC-SSRF
  • Exact file location, rule context, severity, confidence, and remediation guidance.
  • Terminal output, SARIF, JSON, or HTML artifacts generated from the same finding set.
  • Source stays in the workspace or CI runner where the scan executes.

Good fit and limits

Use server-side request forgery (SSRF) when Developers and reviewers deciding how to handle server-side request forgery (SSRF) findings before merge. Keep the boundary explicit: Internal service URLs or fixed destinations may be safe when the allowlist is enforced; test redirects, DNS rebinding, and unexpected schemes before closing the finding.

Run the local proof before adopting a shared gate.

  • Good fit: Developers and reviewers deciding how to handle server-side request forgery (SSRF) findings before merge.
  • Not a fit / do not overreach: Internal service URLs or fixed destinations may be safe when the allowlist is enforced; test redirects, DNS rebinding, and unexpected schemes before closing the finding.

Questions to verify before rollout

These questions keep the decision tied to observable evidence rather than a broad product promise.

What does server-side request forgery (SSRF) cover in practice?

server-side request forgery (SSRF): The practical scope is Detect untrusted URLs reaching outbound requests without an allowlist.. Start with the listed entities or files and confirm the result on representative code.

Which evidence should I inspect for server-side request forgery (SSRF)?

server-side request forgery (SSRF): Inspect Identify the user-controlled URL, the outbound client, and the allowlist or service selector used by the safer example. Keep the source location, rule or comparison context, and exported artifact together.

What should I not infer from server-side request forgery (SSRF)?

server-side request forgery (SSRF): Do not infer universal coverage. Internal service URLs or fixed destinations may be safe when the allowlist is enforced; test redirects, DNS rebinding, and unexpected schemes before closing the finding. Use the relevant comparison or workflow page to test the boundary before changing policy.

What should I try first for server-side request forgery (SSRF)?

server-side request forgery (SSRF): Start with a local run, review one real finding, then choose the linked report, agent, CI, or trust workflow that matches the next decision.

Validate the workflow on your own code.

Start with one local scan, inspect the evidence, and expand to reports, agents, or CI only when the signal is useful.